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I.

INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property is an asset and commodity of expanding
value and importance in our increasingly technology-driven
economy. 2 The patent system seeks to stimulate technological
advances and encourage research and development by providing
financial rewards that make research and development profitable.
One of the challenges that the patent system faces in meeting the
goals of stimulating the technological economy is to provide a
predictable body of law in a field in which the vagaries and
inadequacies of language create impediments to the accurate
description of intellectual property rights. Lack of certainty as to the

metes and bounds of a property right decreases the value and
fungibility of the right and drains the economy of resources by
diverting energy toward sorting out ownership rights.
The interpretation of a patent's claims is at the heart of the
ownership right. Although 35 U.S.C § 112, 6 authorizes claims
written in functional terms, the law surrounding the interpretation of
§ 112, 6 claims is conflicted. In some instances a § 112, 6 claim
has a smaller scope than if the claim described the structure of the
device. A more uniform law of interpretation is necessary in order to
direct focus on the import of the language of the claim and less on its
form. "Since the law is to benefit the inventor's genius and not the
scrivener's talents," 3 secondary considerations should be analyzed in
determining the scope of a claim.
II. BACKGROUND

The 1952 revision of the Patent Act added what is now 6 of
§ 112, allowing patent claims to be drafted that describe an invention
by the function performed by its components (i.e., drafted in meansplus-function language):
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
2

See Arlen Olsen, Patents are Big Moneymaker these Daysfor Companies, 27:19 CAP. DIST.

Bus. REV. 29 (2000) ("During the year 1999, IBM alone raked in more than $1billion in patent
licensing royalties. This is derived from $30 billion of negotiation deals that it did during the
year .... In 1990, it is estimated that in the United States alone $15 billion in revenue was
derived from patent licensing. In 1998, that shot up 700 percent to $100 billion. It is predicted
that by 2005, patent licensing revenues will top halfa trillion dollars annually.").
3Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); id,
at 396 (stating that
"[c]laims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face ....The very nature of words would
make a clear an unambiguous claim a rare occurrence.").
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claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.4
This section clarified that functional claim language was valid, at
a time when courts had formed various opinions on the subject and a
1946 Supreme Court case, Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., v.
Walker,5 had prohibited the use of means-plus-function language to
describe the most crucial element of a combination claim. The
interpretation to be given to the statutory mandate, "such claim shall
be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof," 6 is currently a
source of controversy inthe Federal Circuit.
It has been argued that the judicially created doctrine of
equivalents is codified in § 112, 6. If an accused infringer has
changed the invention in an insubstantial way and the properly
interpreted claims of a patent do not literally cover the accused
device, the accused device still may infringe the patent under the
doctrine of equivalents. To give no remedy against an infringer who
has changed the invention in an insubstantial way
would leave the
7
patent-holder with an essentially valueless patent.
In general, patent claims are interpreted with reference to the
specification, the prosecution history of the application, if in
evidence and, only if necessary, extrinsic sources such as scientific
treatises or expert testimony. 9 A resort to the prosecution history
and/or extrinsic evidence to determine the extent of the invention
serves the notice function in a less than ideal manner, but this nonideality is outweighed by the equitable need to accommodate the
inherent difficulty of adequately describing an invention with words.

The inherent difficulty of adequate description is exacerbated in cases

of complex or technologically novel inventions.

435 U.S.C. § 112,

6 (1994) (formerly 3).

5 See

Halliburton Oil VeU Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946), supcrscdcd by statuie
as stated in In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

635 U.S.C. § 112,

6 (1994).

7GraverTank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde AirProds. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607 (1950).
8

The prosecution history of an application consists of, among other things, the statements made
by the examiner about the patentability of the invention and arguments made by the patentee to
induce the grant of the patent. These arguments frequently consist of explanations of the
invention, discussions of the differences between the invention and the prior art and
amendments to the claims to overcome the prior art.
9
See Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW

Language in a claim, such as "means for," raises a presumption
that § 112, 6 applies to the claim element. Theoretically, any time
minimal structure, or no structure at all, is recited for an element,

§ 112, 6 might apply. For literal infringement, a court must find
identical function and identical, or equivalent, structure in the accused
device. Identity, or equivalency, of structure is sometimes determined
by comparing the physical structure disclosed in the specification

(corresponding to the means-plus-function element in the claim) to
the accused device. Read literally, a means-plus-function claim
encompasses all structures that might perform the recited function.
Section 112, 6 limits this scope by mandating that claims "be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof."' 10
Controversy surrounds the question of whether the statutory
equivalents in § 112, 6 are similar to the equitable equivalents of a
doctrine of equivalents analysis" or if, instead, they are the "doctrine
of equivalents in a restrictive role," which apparently mandates a
physical comparison of structures. Although a doctrine of equivalents
analysis is often nominally applied, it is not clear that the application
always leads to a claim with a fair scope. For example, in a recent
line of cases from the Federal Circuit, the way prong of thefunctionway-result test reduces to a comparison of structures, i.e., the
equivalency analysis reduces to a consideration of the physical
structures of the two devices, a comparison that almost always leads
to a finding of non-equivalency.
IV. RECENT CASES

[The word 'equivalent' in § 112, 6 should not be confused...
'2
with the 'doctrine of equivalents.
D.MI., Inc. v. Deere & Co. involved an invention for a "plow

system with means for adjusting the spacing of plow units while the
plow is in motion."' 3 Deere, apparently having conceded that their
035 U.S.C. § 112,

6 (1994).

" See generally GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 608 (finding that an equitable doctrine of equivalents
analysis looks to the substantiality of the differences between the accused device and the
claimed invention or a second test is applied that looks to whether the accused device performs
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same
result." For a § 112, 6 claim, the function has been specified in the literal claim language.).
12 D.M.L, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

" Id. at 1572.
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plow system included all other limitations of the first claim of
D.M.L's patent, contested that its plow system had a compensating
means that was similar to the one claimed by D.M.I.'s patent. The
compensating means was described in the patent's specification as a
parallelogram structure. 14 The Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's holding that "D.M.. cannot avoid its own patentee's
definition of a 'compensation means' and claim equivalence in every
structure which achieves the same result by a method and structure
which do not even come close to falling within that definition."' 5 In
reversing the grant of summary judgment, the court stated that
although there might not be an issue of infringement under a
§ 112, 6 interpretation of "equivalent," the doctrine of equivalents
might yield a different result. The court noted that the range of
equivalents is evaluated "in light of the prosecution history, the
pioneer-non-pioneer status of the invention, and the prior art,"' 6 in
concluding that the means-plus-function clause scope should not be
limited to structures employing a parallelogram.
Although D.MI. did not discuss a definition for a § 112, 6
equivalent, implicit in the decision is the idea that a § 112, 6
equivalent is something different from and significantly narrower than
the doctrine of equivalents' equivalent.17 In affirming the district
court's holding of no literal infringement, the court in D.MI.L affirmed
an interpretation of a § 112, 6 equivalent as a device that is very
close to being the same as the structure disclosed in the specification.
In Vahnont Industries, hIc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co., the

Federal Circuit reiterated that, "the word 'equivalent' in § 112 should
not be confused, as it apparently was here, with the 'doctrine of
equivalents."', 18 The court explained:
[i]n the context of section 112,... an equivalent results from an
insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the
structure, material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification. A
determination of section 112 equivalence does not involve the

equitable tripartite test of the doctrine of equivalents .... '[Tihe
sole question' under § 112 involves comparison of the structure in
the accused device which performs the claimed function to

14see id.
'Id. at 1573.
6
1d. at 1575.
7 see id.

18Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
D.M.L, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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thestructure in the specification.'

9

The Federal Circuit continued:
[a] claim limitation described as a means for performing a
function, if read literally, could encompass any conceivable means

for performing the function ....Section 112 permits means-plusfunction language in a combination claim, but . . . limits the
applicant to the structure, material, or acts in the specification and
their equivalents. Indeed the section operates more like the reverse

doctrine of equivalents
because it restricts the coverage of literal
20
claim language.
The position of the court appears to be that the resort to the
structures disclosed in the specification and equivalents to interpret
the claims is meant to narrow the breadth of the claim; therefore, the
range of equivalents given must be narrow. The reverse doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine that arises when an accused
device falls literally within the scope of the claim language.2' Under
the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the accused device is found not to
infringe if the accused device is "'so far changed from the patented
invention that it performs the same or a similar function in a
substantially different way.' '22 A different statutory interpretation
might conclude that the resort to the structure disclosed in the
specification narrows the literal reach of the claim scope and the
phrase "and equivalents thereof' thereafter expands it to its fair scope.
The fact that a comparison with the disclosed structure narrows the
breadth of the claim does not mandate a narrower range of
equivalents also.
The patent-in-suit in Valmont claimed a center pivot irrigator for
watering the comers of a field which included a control means for an
extension arm. The structure disclosed in the specification as
performing the function of controlling the extension arm was a device
that sensed the angular relationship between the main arm and the
extension arm in order to generate a signal to guide the extension arm.
The accused irrigation system used a device that guided the extension
arm by sensing electromagnetic signals from a buried cable.
Applying a § 112 analysis, the court concluded that the two control
19See id.
at 1042 (citing Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
21 See 5a DONALD S.CHISUM, CHIS.IUM ON PATENTS § 18.04(4), at 18-391 (2000), available at
20Id.

LEXIS, Patent Law Library, Chisum on Patents file (Release No. 75).
22 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950)).
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means were not structurally equivalent. The Court reached a similar
conclusion applying a doctrine of equivalents function-way-result
analysis, because the accused device performed substantially the same
function and achieved substantially the same result in a very different
way.-2 The court did consider prosecution history to the extent that it
noted Valmont argued, in an unsuccessful reissue proceeding 4 for a
patent for a buried cable steering system, that the buried cable system
was not obvious over the patent-in-suit because the approaches were
completely different.'2
Valmont was an unfriendly decision to the patent-holder in
several respects. Although it is generally true as an evidentiary matter
that a party's admissions are admissible evidence, it is not as clear
that a party's admissions in one patent application are appropriately
treated as 'prosecution history' in a second application. Additionally,
the reissue application for the patent that would have covered the
buried cable device was apparently denied by the Patent and
Trademark Office (hereinafter, PTO) as obvious (not patentably
distinct) over the patent Valmont was asserting in litigation (the angle
comparison device). The Federal Circuit then held that the buried
cable device was so far changed from the angle comparison device
that no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could be27
found.26 Although obviousness speaks to a slightly different issue
and would not be determinative of equivalency, obviousness is
evidence of insubstantial differences. 28 Thus, one forum held that the
devices were very similar and another held that they were not, and the
inventor lost out both times.
In addition, the Federal Circuit's application of the function-wayresult test in Vahnont, appeared to be based on similar considerations
as its appraisal of structural equivalence. The court primarily
discussed physical dissimilarities in concluding the devices operated
in a substantially different way.

23 Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1044.

U.S.C. § 251 (1994). A patentee can seek to have a granted patent reissued ifthe patentee
has claimed more or less than the patentee had a right to, or if the patent is inoperative or
2435

invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawings. Id. The patent is reevarnined by the
Patent and Trademark office during the reissue proceeding. Id.
25 Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1045.
2
6See id.
27

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).

28 Some of the same considerations, such as the art-recognized interchangeability of two

devices, enter into a determination of obviousness and of equivalency.
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In Dawn Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc. 29 the Federal
Circuit applied a doctrine of equivalents analysis to a means-plusfunction claim, but implied in a footnote that the legal propriety of
applying the doctrine of equivalents to a claim drafted in means-plusfunction form was unclear. The patented technology involved a
mechanism for adjusting the height of a farm implement and the
range of equivalents for a "means for locking and selectively
releasing ' 30 a connector was at issue. In its equivalence analysis, the
court applied the function-way-result test and considered several
factors, such as that the mechanisms were structurally quite different,
and operated quite differently and that the patent itself strongly
suggested the two structures were not equivalent because the accused
device had pins for locking the structures in place and the patent
taught away from using pins.31
In Dawn Equipment, all three judges filed additional opinions.
Judge Plager wrote that he found "[t]he law in this area confused and
confusing. 3 2 He noted that there was a lack of clearly defined

operational differences between the § 112,

6 notion of equivalents

equivalents. 33

and the doctrine of
His opinion expressed his
disagreement with the statement in Valmont suggesting that the
function-way-result test was not applicable to determining
equivalence under § 112, 6 and also expressed a belief that the way
and resultprongs were useful to the extent the test is useful at all.
Judge Plager concluded there should not be two notions of
equivalents since it was "an invitation to confused thinking," 34 and
suggested that
the practice of claiming under § 112, 6 would be much improved
if we adhered to the proposition that the 'equivalents' of 'structure,
material, or acts described in the specification' are those found to
be within the
scope of that term as it is used in § 112, 6, and not
35
elsewhere.
Judge Newman wrote separately, stating that no policy reason
existed for eliminating access to the doctrine of equivalents for claims
drafted in means-plus-function form. "The style of claims is not the
29
30

Davn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1d. at 1015.

"Id. at 1016.
12Id. at 1018.

33see id.
mid. at 1021.
35See Danvn Equip.,

140 F. 3d at 1022.
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sine qua non of the patent right, and the equitable purposes of the
doctrine of equivalents do not rise and fall with whether the patentee
used the claim form authorized in section 112 paragraph 6. ' ' 36
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. CardinalIndustries,
Inc., a case before Judges Michel, Plager and Lourie, the Federal
Circuit defined the range of equivalents for a claim element drafted in
means-plus-function form narrowly. 37 The litigation involved two
patents owned by Chiuminatta, one for a saw for cutting concrete
before it had hardened completely and a second one for a method of
cutting the incompletely cured concrete. The inventive features of the
saw were an upwardly rotating leading edge on the blade and support
feature for applying pressure to the surface of the concrete. The
accused device met almost all the limitations of a claim literally, but it
did not have a means for supporting the surface of the concrete
adjacent to the leading edge of the cutting blade that was physically
the same as the means disclosed in Chiuminatta's patent. The
structure disclosed in the patent for supporting the surface of the
concrete was a skid plate, that was further described as a generally
flat metal plate with rounded ends. The accused device supported the
surface of the concrete adjacent to the leading edge of the saw with
deformable wheels.
Under operational conditions, the wheels
flattened out and formed flat planes adjacent to the saw blade on the
surface of the concrete.
In an opinion written by Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit
reiterated that where § 112, 6 applies, "[t]he proper test is whether
the differences between the structure in the accused device and any
disclosed in the specification are insubstantial. 3 8 The defendant,

Cardinal, argued that "for a structure to be equivalent to a skid plate,

it must include substantially all of the structural features of a skid39

plate, and thus must be hard, flat, and fixedly attached to the saw."
The Federal Circuit agreed with Cardinal's element-by-element
structural equivalence analysis and a finding of no literal infringement
followed.
Although Chiuminatta argued that the wheels were equivalent to
the skid plate because they were interchangeable in the Chiuminatta
concrete saw, the court rejected the argument, stating "[s]uch
evidence does not obviate the statutory mandate to compare the
36see id
37
Chiuminatta
3

91d. at 1309.
39
See id.

Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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accused structure to the corresponding structure,"" The court also
rejected Chiuminatta's argument because known interchangeability in
the abstract is not probative. Known interchangeability means that
those of ordinary skill in the art recognized the interchangeability of
plates with wheels for the specific purpose disclosed
in the patent,
41
i.e., for supporting the surface of the concrete.
The court next considered the doctrine of equivalents, stating
"[a]lthough an equivalence analysis under § 112, 6, and the doctrine
of equivalents are not coextensive (for example, § 112, 6, requires
identical, not equivalent function) and have different origins and
purposes, their tests for equivalence are closely related. 42 The
opinion reiterated that equivalents under § 112, 6 "is an application
of the doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role" 43 and suggested
that "a finding of a lack of literal infringement for lack of equivalent
structure under a means-plus-function limitation may Preclude a
finding of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents. '
If the structure differs insubstantially from the structure disclosed
in the specification but could readily have been disclosed in the
specification, then no doctrine of equivalents analysis should apply.
In contrast, if due to technological advances, an after-developed
technology that could not have been disclosed in the patent, is an
insubstantial change from what is claimed in the patent, then it should
be held to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.4 5 The Federal
Circuit opined that "[tihere is no 46
policy-based reason why a patentee
should get two bites at the apple."
Although the denial of equivalents, except for after-developed
technologies, contradicts the general precept for a doctrine of
equivalents analysis, Kraft Foods, Inc. v. InternationalTrading Co.

explicitly affirmed this rule for § 112, 6 situations.47 In Kraft
Foods,the Federal Circuit held that since § 112, 6 language was not
used in the
claims-in-suit, equivalents could cover preexisting
48
technology.
40

Id. at 1310.

41See id.

42 See id.(citing Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)).
41 Warner-JenkinsonCo., 520 U.S. at 21.
44 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fcd. Cir. 1998).
41 See id.
46
1d. at 1311.
47 Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (involving a
patent for food packaging with compartmentalized rigid trays).
41Id. at 1373.
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In Chiuminatta, the reader is left to wonder what type of device
would have constituted infiingement. One suggestion that seems to
be supported by the case is that nothing short of literal identity to the
skid plate would constitute infiingement. Thus, it might be concluded
under this opinion, that equivalents are not given for claims written in
means-plus-function format.
Interestingly, the court in Chiuminatta further went on to find
Chiuminatta's method patent, that was directed to a method for
cutting concrete before the concrete had hardened sufficiently to
allow cutting by a conventional abrasive concrete saw, valid and
infringed.49 Cardinal's sales of the abovementioned saw induced
infiingement of the method patent. Thus, Chiuminatta essentially was
able to obtain protection for all means of supporting the surface
during the cutting of the concrete. For the method claim, the court
held that Cardinal's wheeled concrete saw induced infringement of
Chiuminatta's method patent.
In Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., the Federal Circuit
purported to interpret the test espoused in Chitminatta for the
interpretation of claims written in functional language according to
§ 112, 6 over a vigorous dissent by Judge Lourie (the author of the
Chiuminattaopinion). 50 The district court had granted a motion for
JMOL5 1 after the jury returned a verdict of infringement for Odetics,
the patent-holder, because it "deemed its . . . decision to be

'mandated'

by
52

Chiuminatta.

'the

analytical framework established'
by
The Federal Circuit stated, "[b]ecause Chiuminaiia

did not mark a change in the proper infringement analysis under
§ 112, 6, ... we... order the jury's verdict reinstated.""
The district court understood Chiuminatta to indicate that
"statutory equivalence under § 112,
6 requires 'component by
component' equivalence between the relevant structure identified in
the patent and the portion of the accused device asserted to be
structurally equivalent," a reading that the Federal Circuit stated
"misapprehends § 112,
6 infringement analysis and is therefore
incorrect.' 54 Interestingly, in discussing the law, the Federal Circuit
cited similar cases for a similar proposition as had been cited in

" Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1312-13.
Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp. 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
5
'Judgment as a matter of law.
5Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1263.
53See id.
50

"4Id.at

1266.
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Chiuminatta, including the statement that, "[s]tructural equivalence
under § 112, 6 is, as noted by the Supreme Court, 'an application of
the doctrine of equivalents .. in a restrictive role."' 55 The Odetics
court stated that equivalents under § 112, 6 "invokes the familiar
concept of an insubstantial change., 56 Additionally, equivalence
under § 112, 6 is narrower than under the doctrine of equivalents
because functional identity is required; thus, the function-way-result
test only requires consideration of equivalence of the way and the
result in a comparison between the asserted structure and the
"corresponding structure, acts, or materials described in the
57
specification."
The majority explained, "[t]he similar analysis of equivalents
under § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents does not, however,
lead to the conclusion that Pennwalt and Warner-Jenkinsoncommand
a component-by-component analysis of structural equivalence under
§ 112, 6." 58 Although Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. mandates that a doctrine of equivalents infringement
analysis compare the accused device to the claimed invention on an
element-by-element basis, i.e., an accused device must have a part
corresponding to each limitation of the claim or its equivalent, this
test does not imply that within an element written in means-plusfunction form, the structure disclosed in the specification must be met
element-for-element by an accused structure.5 9 The element-byelement test applies to a claim as a whole and requires that each
element of the claim be found literally or equivalently in the accused
structure. A means-plus-function phrase, on the other hand, is a claim
element, not a claim. "This is why structures with different numbers
of parts may still be equivalent under § 112, 6."6o
The technology in Odetics involved a robotic tape storage
system. 6' The parties contested the scope of a claim element directed
to a rotary means for providing access to a storage library. The
Federal Circuit had previously held that the corresponding structure in
the specification implicated the components that receive force and
rotate as a result of that force, i.e., a rod, gear, and rotary loading
5

5 d. at 1267 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)),

6

" Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1267.

57

See id.

" Id. at 1267-68 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28 and Pennwalt Corp. v. DurmndWayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (1987)).
s9Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1268.
6 See id.
61
Id. at 1263.
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mechanism. The accused device used "cam followers," or pins,
affixed to the bottom of the bin array to rotate the bin array. The
majority agreed with Odetics that the parallels between the claimed
and accused structures (i.e., that the patented device caused rotation
by exerting force against the teeth of the gear and the accused device
accomplished rotation by exerting force against the cam followers),
made the two devices equivalent. The court discussed the expert
testimony presented at trial in which the expert stated repeatedly "that
the 'rotary means' structure was equivalent to the 'bin array' in the
accused devices" and "noted that 'you can push on a pin as well as
you can push on the gear tooth"' and "that the way that the two
structures accomplish the claimed 'rotary'62 function, and the result of
that function, is substantially equivalent."
Judge Lourie dissented from both the analysis of equivalency
under § 112, 6 and the majority's conclusion.
If one is to determine whether the disclosed structure of a claimed
means is equivalent to the corresponding structure of an accused
device, I do not see how it is possible to do so without looking at

what components the structures
consist of, i.e., by deconstructing
63
or dissecting the structures.
Additionally, the Judge Lourie disagreed with the majority's
reliance on expert testimony that "served only to prove that the
claimed gear and cam followers performed the same function" 64 and
he faulted the testimony as "a bare assertion that the two structures
were equivalent.' 65 In other words, reliance on functional identity
expands § 112, 6 beyond its intended limits because it allows any
and every means to satisfy the claim limitation. Judge Lourie further
expressed the opinion that expert testimony was not necessary to
determine equivalency because structural analysis and comparison are
relatively straightforward, i.e.,
[i]n the disclosed structure, the gear is a disc or cylinder with teeth
that fit the teeth of another gear, thus enabling the disclosed gear to
move in conjunction with the bin array, whereas the cam followers
are smooth pins attached to
the array by a stem, and turn
66
independently from the array.
Despite the majority's assertion in Odetics that Chiuminattadid
62Md

at 1270.

at 1277 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
See id.
65
Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1278 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
66
1d. (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 807, 814 (E.D.Va. 1998)).
63Id.

64
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not stand for the proposition that in § 112, 6 cases the accused
structure and the disclosed structure should be deconstructed and
compared to determine equivalence, others might disagree. Not only
did the district court read Chiuminattaas stating this proposition, but
the author of the dissent in Chiuminatta,Judge Lourie, indicated this
was his view of the law. It is argued in this paper, that the test
espoused by Judge Lourie far too frequently yields a similar result as
does a test asking if the two structures are exactly the same.
Recently, two more cases have been decided by the Federal Circuit
that further illustrate the varying opinions among the judges regarding
the proper interpretation of means-plus-function claims.
IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc.67 espouses a
viewpoint most similar to that of the majority in Odetics. The case
involved a computer-controlled machining tool. Among other issues,
the parties contested the interpretation of a claim element directed to
"a control means for transferring a control program... into alterable
memory and for recording the ... contents of said memory onto an
external medium," i.e., a means for transferring and recording data. 8
The specification disclosed a tape cassette as a means for recording
data and the accused device used a floppy disk drive.
Despite a lack of physical similarity between the components of a
tape and a floppy disk drive, the court found them to be equivalent
under § 112, 6. The Federal Circuit stated that "the statute requires
two structures to be equivalent, but it does not require them to be
'structurally equivalent', i.e., it does not mandate an equivalency
comparison that necessarily focuses heavily or exclusively on
physical structure. 69
The court attempted to distinguish Chiuminatta, stating, "[iun
other cases, in which the specific physical features of the structure
corresponding to the 'means' limitation may have more relevance to
the claimed invention, a finding of noninfringement results."7 This
distinction is not entirely satisfying since it might be argued that in

Chiuminatta,the physical features of sliding across the surface of the
concrete versus rolling are irrelevant to the invention, the heart of
which lies in applying pressure to the surface of the concrete as it was
being cut.
However, the court in IMS went on to say, "we consider the
67

IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

63
69

Id. at 1427.
1d. at 1436.

70

See id.
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substantiality of their [the floppy disk drive and the tape drive's]
differences in the context of the claimed invention.'
Since, in the

court's opinion, this did not seem to be a case in which any physical
features of the interface means, such as the physical format of
recorded data or the mechanism for accessing data, were important to
the invention, an issue existed as to whether the devices were
equivalent. Further, the evidence supplied by IMS, that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the interchangeability
of a floppy disk drive and a tape cassette for recording data, is
relevant in the issue of equivalence.
In IMS, the court gave little consideration to the physical
structures of the disk drive and the tape drive7 Certainly, both
record data on magnetic media, but a tape operates serially, in that a
tape is moved past a stationary head and stored on reels on either end,
whereas a disk drive has a movable head(s) and a disk that is round,
flat, and spins. Perhaps it is because a disk and a tape are well-known
art-recognized equivalents or perhaps because there is a tendency to
treat computers and their component parts as black boxes, focusing
only on their function, a finding of non-equivalence seems
improbable. For this reason, ME is perhaps a demonstration of the
inadequacy of a test focusing inordinately on the physical structures
of an accused and disclosed device.
73
In another recent case, Kenico Sales, Inc. v. ControlPapers Co.,
the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Lourie) agreed with the district
court that no reasonable jury could find infringement either literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents for an accused envelope that had

adhesive in a different location than that disclosed in the specification
for the invention. The patent was directed to plastic security
envelopes that are tamper-evident, i.e., like other envelopes, they can
be opened by applying low temperatures to the adhesive region, but
unlike other envelopes they cannot be resealed without leaving
evidence of having been opened. The disputed claim element, "a
plastic envelope closing means," 74 in one embodiment, was a flap that
folded over the envelope's opening and was glued to the outside of
the envelope by two types of adhesive, a conventional one and a
tamper-evident one. The accused envelope placed the regular
adhesive on the inside edge of the open end of the envelope, and the
71Id. at 1437.
72See id
73Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. (2000)).
4

7 1d. at 1355.
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tamper-evident adhesive on a flap that sealed to the outside of the
envelope. In holding that the accused envelope did not infringe, the

Federal Circuit, like the district court before it, discussed and
compared physical structures.
Although the Court appeared to apply the way and result prongs
of a doctrine of equivalents analysis, the application of the test
focused on the physical structures of the two envelopes.
[U]nlike the disclosed flap, which closes by folding over the
envelope, the dual-lip structure closes the accused envelope in a
different way by meeting together and binding via the internal
adhesive. The accused structure . . . also yields a substantially
different result. The first and second sealing means in the disclosed
structure are ultimately attached to the outside of the envelope. In
contrast, the first sealing means in the TripLok envelope is
internally attached to75the two lips of the dual-lip structure, thereby
sealing the envelope.

Despite having applied a potentially narrower function-way-result
analysis, i.e., one focused more heavily on structure than is typically
applied in doctrine of equivalents situations, the court went on to hold
that a structure failing a § 112, 6 equivalents analysis should also
fail a doctrine of equivalents analysis. The court reasoned that both
types of equivalents resorted to an analysis of the way and result
therefore a failure in one should be considered a failure in the other.
The court also appeared to back away from its holding in
Chiuminattathat the doctrine of equivalents should only be applied to

after-developed technologies in § 112, 6 cases. Although the issue
was brought up by the parties, the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine
of equivalents to an existing technology embodied in the accused
device.
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The content of 6 was added to Section 112 during the revision
of the Patent Act that was codified into law in 1952. Although its
legislative history is not abundant, it is generally accepted 76 that 6,
which allows claims to be drafted using functional language without
the recital of structure, was enacted as a response to a Supreme Court
decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker. 7 In
7'1d.
at 1365.
76
See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997),
'n Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946) supersededby statute as
stated in In re Donaldson Co.., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Halliburton Oil, the Supreme Court considered the acceptability of
functional claim language to describe an element of a claim for a
combination of admittedly old elements, at "the exact point of
novelty. '78 The patent involved a device for determining the depth of
an oil well using sonic echoes, which improved the accuracy of the
measurement over preexisting devices through the addition of a
component for measuring known distances of features (tubing joints)
along the sides of the well. The Supreme Court held the claim invalid
for indefiniteness, and faulted Walker, the patentee, for attempting to
enforce the claim as though it could prevent any machine, which
performed the function of clearly and distinctly catching and
recording echoes from tubing joints, from being used in the claimed
combination. The Court reasoned,
[i]n this age of technological development there may be many
other devices beyond our present information or indeed our
imagination which will perform that function and yet fit these
claims. And unless frightened from the course of experimentation
by broad functional claims like these, inventive genius may evolve
many more devices to accomplish the same purpose.
The Court seemingly did not reach the issue that a patent could be
obtained on the new device itself (i.e., outside the confines of the
improvement invention), or that the reverse doctrine of equivalents
could be applied (with reference to the disclosed structure) to narrow
the reach of the claim. The rule stated by the Court that no
infringement would be found for after-developed technologies used to
perform the function claimed in the patented combination is no longer
the law. °
For the drafting of the Patent Act of 1952, "[the Drafting
Committee ...was given the task of preparing... a codification that
contained only changes on which substantial agreement of the patent
community could be obtained."8'
The 1952 Act is generally
understood to be a response to the increasing tendency to invalidate
patents in the courts that developed in the 1930s and 1940s. 8- An
78HalliburtonOil, 329 U.S. at 8.
9
7 1d. at 12.
0 See Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 37 (1997) C'Insofar as the question under the doctrine of
equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed clement, the proper time
for evaluating equivalency - and thus kmowledge of interchangeability bet=een elements - is at
the time ofinfringement, not at the time the patent was issued.").

"' Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, Ia The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrinesof
Means-Plus-FunctionPatentClaims,23 RUTGERS COMPUTER &TECHl. U. 227,273-74 (1997).
82 See L James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of
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article by Rudolph Hoffinan and Edward Heller8 3 discusses the
legislative history in some depth and concludes by recommending
that 6 be amended, keeping the provision allowing means-plusfunction language in combination claims, but deleting the resort to the
specification to determine the corresponding structure and equivalents
thereof. The enunciated goal behind the suggestion is for "a
combination claim having elements described in functional terms to
be subjected to the same treatment as any other claim," by allowing
the courts free reign, unhampered by statutory language to determine
a body of law. 84
It is argued here that a call for an absence of statutory direction is
misplaced because clear statutory mandates proved a buffer against

court-driven trends toward invalidation and contraction of patent
grants. Additionally, a reasonable statutory interpretation resulting in
an application of the doctrine of equivalents can result in a fair claim
scope because a fair application of the doctrine of equivalents can
yield a uniform claim scope independent of the language used in
drafting the claim.
There is evidence that the drafters of the Act intended to codify
the application of the doctrine of equivalents to claims drafted using
functional language. The Honorable Joseph R. Bryson stated in an
address before the Philadelphia Patent Law Association,
[a]ll the elements of a combination now will be able to be claimed
in terms of what they do as well as in terms of what they are. This
has been strongly recommended by the patent bar .... This
provision also
gives recognition to the existence of the doctrine of
85
equivalents.
Additionally, L. James Harris, patent counsel for the Drafting
Committee, has commented, "[ilt was felt by the drafters that means
claims should be permitted in combination claims... to provide for
the proper interpretation of the claims commensurate with the
invention,86 the doctrine of equivalents is specifically mentioned in the
section.,
1952, 23 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 658, 659 (1955). Mr. Harris served as Committee Counsel and

Counsel to the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, the
United States House of Representatives. He directed and supervised the actual wyork of
preparing preliminary drafts and the bill that culminated in the Patent Act of 1952.
83
See Hofinann, Jr. & Heller, III, supra note 81.
" Id. at 290.
898 CONG. REC. A415-16 (1952) (extension of remarks of Rep. Bryson) Congressman Bryson
was the Chairman of the House Committee that oversaw the drafting of the Patent Act of 1952.
86See Harris, supra note 82, at 687-88.
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In a footnote, Harris cites two cases approvingly in which
"[c]ourts have interpreted means-function clauses to protect what is
disclosed and equivalents. 8 7 In Ford Motor Co. v Gordon Form
Lathe Co., the Sixth Circuit stated the law as, "[ain inventor cannot
by the mere use of the word 'means' appropriate any and all kinds of
mechanism or devices which may perform the specified function, or
any other mechanism or device than that which is described in the
patent or which is its mechanical equivalent."88 The court then found

that the result accomplished by the tool and the type of work it was
able to perform, was different than that which could be performed by
the patented tool.8 9 Probably most damning, the accused tool did not
have the same function (purpose) as claimed in the patent. Thus, the
court in Ford Motor Co. 's finding of non-infringement was reached
because the accused device did not perform the claimed function. A
question was left on how the court's statement of the law would apply
to a device which did perform the same function.
In Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., Judge L. Hand writing for
a majority in the Second Circuit, held claims containing functional
elements infringed because "[t]he defendant has taken everything
which the Buonos contributed to the art, with mechanical variations
too trivial to deserve discussion." 90 The case implied the invention
did not reside in the particular method of performing the function
recited, but in the performance of the function itself. The disputed
claim element, in a claim for a sewing machine, was for an operating
means which turned a pivoted device at predetermined intervals.
The court explained, "[t]he invention did not reside in the
mechanical train connecting the eccentric with the table, but in a train
which should tilt it at intervals longer than the oscillations of the rib.
The details not being important, the general notion so embodied the
inventors might protect." 91 The court acknowledged the difficulty in
determining the appropriate range of mechanical equivalents by
saying, "[i]t is only a question of how far the functional element is

anchored in the disclosure, and how far it floats as a vague threat in
the art. That is a question of degree, and admits of no general
solution ... .92
See Harris, supra note 82, at 688 n.146 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon Form Lathe Co., 87
F.2d 390 (6h Cir. 1937) and Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1935)).
'sFordMotor Co., 87 F.2d at 392.
9 See id.
90 Buono, 77 F.2d at 277.
91See id.
92
See id.
87
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A focus on where the invention resides seems more equitable than
a focus solely on structure. As noted by Hoffman and Heller, and
demonstrated in Chiuminatta, even if a functional claim is narrowed
to cover essentially the disclosed structure, a method claim can

provide broad coverage of all structures performing the claimed
function. In Chiuminatta,although the accused saw was found not to
infringe the device patent, a method patent directed to cutting
incompletely cured concrete based on the same invention did cover
the accused device. A focus on where the invention resides
potentially avoids inconsistent results between device and method
patents.
Furthermore, as a result of the Patent Bar's involvement in
drafting the amendments, the drafters of the Act took notice of the
difficulties experienced by practitioners drafting patent applications.
Specifically, Harris noted that, "[g]reater use of means in combination
claims should simplify claim drafting and add to their clarity ....
The lack of new structural terminology to keep pace with the
increasing complexity of modem technology will . . . favor the
practical advantages of 'means' claims. 93
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
If an accused device meets every limitation of a claim, it is said to
infringe the claim literally. If the accused device does not meet every
claim limitation literally, courts will apply the doctrine of equivalents,
and if the accused structure is determined to be an equivalent, the
accused structure infringes the patent. The policy for allowing an
accused device that does not fall literally within the claims to
nevertheless infringe a patent was stated in Graver Tank &
ManufacturingCo. v. Linde Air ProductCo.:94
to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy
every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent
grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would
leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to
make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in
the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take

the copied
matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of
95
the law.

The Court offered an additional test, "[a] patentee may invoke
93

See Harris, supra note 82, at 688.

94Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
9S1d. at 607.
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this doctrine... 'if [the accused device] performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result.' ' 96 The case in Gramer Tank involved the substitution of
manganese for magnesium in an electric welding process for fluxes.
In finding that the manganese silicate was the equivalent of the
magnesium silicate in the flux, the Court stated, "[w]hat constitutes
equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the
prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in
patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum." 97 The Court further noted that "[a]n
important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was" and went on to consider
expert testimony regarding the purposes served by the manganese and
magnesium silicates in the fluxes
and the known interchangeability of
9
the two compounds in fluxes. 8
In War-ner-Jenkinson,99 the Supreme Court affirmed the viability
of the doctrine of equivalents as enunciated in Grmer Tank.10 0 It
further refined and narrowed its application by stating that the
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the

claim, not to the invention as a whole.

An element-by-element

approach ensures that a "plethora of meaningful limitations" in the
claims are not erased or ignored. Additionally, it announced a
rebuttable presumption to be applied against the patentee, such that if
the patent claims were amended during prosecution, it would be
presumed that the claims were amended to avoid prior art, and thus a
range of equivalents would be precluded. The Court noted that "the
proper time for evaluating equivalency-and thus knowledge of
interchangeability between elements-is
at the time of infringement,
0l
not at the time the patent was issued.' '
The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson addressed the
inadequacy of the two tests for equivalence, the "insubstantial
differences test" and the "function, way, result" test, and noted that
there was "substantial agreement" that the "function, way, result" test
might be more suitable for analyzing mechanical inventions than for

96

Id. at 608.
97Id. at 609.
98 See id.

99Wamer-Jenkdnson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
100See id.
'0Id. at 37.
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products or processes and "the insubstantial differences test offers
little additional guidance as to what might render any given difference
'insubstantial."" 02
After noting the inadequacy of linguistic
formulations of a test, the Supreme Court expressed confidence that
the Federal Circuit would refine the test over the course of case-bycase determinations.
Using a "concept borrowed from obviousness determinations objective indicia" to analyze equivalence, Mary Consalvi discusses
factors that have been considered by the Federal Circuit as evidence
of equivalence or non-equivalence.'0 3 She suggests that review and
balancing of such factors should be used to determine equivalence in
a manner similar to the way secondary considerations are used in
obviousness determinations.'t 4 Specifically, several factors are
potentially relevant, including the pioneering status of the invention, a
long-felt need for the patented invention and the alleged equivalent,
commercial success of the accused or patented invention and
evidence of independent development, of efforts to design around or
evidence of copying.105 These factors seek to determine the relative
contributions to the art of the patentee and of the alleged infringer and
the extent to which the accused device uses the teachings of patented
device.

If the accused device is a small improvement or no improvement
and the patented device is a large improvement in the art, this would
tend to indicate equivalence. Evidence that an accused device has
received a patent, and thereby has been found to be non-obvious over
the prior art device, is evidence of non-equivalence. It is not
conclusive evidence, though, since the prior art patent may still
dominate the improvement patent.10 6 Additionally, evidence that the
accused infringer attempted to design around the device can be
relevant in demonstrating non-equivalence. 0 7
From a policy
perspective, designing around is encouraged, and evidence that the
accused infringer has spent large sums of money should be evidence
1

Id.at 40.

103
Mary S.Consalvi, ObjectiveIndiciaofEquivalenceandNonequivalence - an Update, at 171,

173 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 573,
1999).
'l'Id. at 175.
1o5Id.at 175-78 (noting that just as in the case of obviousness considerations, some of these
factors may be more relevant that others. For instance, evidence of commercial success may be

due to marketing efforts rather than superiority of the invention.).

'5d.at 184 (citing Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1996)),

'07 1d. at 185.
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of substantial differences.10 8
Other indicia are evidence of
interchangeability and interoperability between the structures in the
accused and patented device.
In situations in which the function-way-result or substantiality of
the differences tests do not seem adequate or satisfying, evidence of
the above secondary considerations may yield a more equitable result.
This is especially true in § 112, 6 cases in which a comparison of
physical structures yields an unfairly narrow claim scope.
VII.APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS TO
FUNCTIONAL CLAIM ELEMENTS

Although the use of a means claim is never entirely unavoidable,
frequently there is not a simple generic term for the device being
claimed. Language is a reflection of necessity and happenstance; and
if a class of devices is in common usage, most likely there vil be a
generic word describing the devices. In contrast, if a device is part of

a specialized art or very new, there might not be a word that
generically describes variations on a functional theme adequately. To
have the scope of claims vary depending on whether the
inventor/drafter is lucky enough to find a generic word (e.g., scale
describes a generic class of devices that weigh objects and includes
mechanical balances, electronic top-loading devices and devices with
hanging pans) or a word that describes a class of devices by the
function they perform (e.g., fastener, spreader, plug or light) is a bit
unfair.
In discussing existing law, the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP) § 2181109 states that a presumption arises that
§ 112, 6 applies if the claim is drafted as a "means for performing
function X." "[T]he use of the term 'means' (particularly... 'means
for') generally invokes section 112(6) and that the use of a different
formulation generally does not."' 10 The former practice of the PTO in
examining applications, in accordance with the mandate to give
claims the broadest reasonable interpretation, was to interpret a
means-plus-function claim as reading for any prior art means for
performing the function. Since the Federal Circuit decision in In re
'0"Id.
at 186-87 (noting, though, that caution should be exercised because it is possible that large
sums were expended on failed experiments, and the accused infringer thereafter copied the
patented device).
'09 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2181 (7th ed. 1998). The MPEP is a
reference published by the PTO and used by patent examiners, applicants, and attorneys. It
contains guidelines for the examination of patent applications.
11Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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Donaldson, Co.,"' the PTO still searches the prior art for all devices
that perform the claimed function, but now gives the applicant the
opportunity to rebut that the prior art device is the equivalent of the
structure disclosed in the applicant's specification. However, the
MPEP § 2184 notes that in determining the range of equivalents for a
disclosed structure, an equivalent may be broad enough to encompass
all structures performing the claimed functions-for instance, where
(among other situations) "apparatus
claims are treated as
' 12
claims."'
method
from
indistinguishable
Thus, although there seems to be a tendency in the courts to
narrow the scope of a broad claim drafted in means-plus-function
form, there actually may be times in which a range of equivalents as
broad as the literal language of the claim may be appropriate. Since
the application has been examined in the PTO according to its
broadest reasonable interpretation, a presumption arises that the claim
is valid over the prior art for all means that satisfy the function

requirement. If a prior art device does fall within the ambit of the
claims, the prosecution history will disclose this fact and prosecution
history estoppel will narrow the claims.
If a choice exists between a range of equivalents that is
somewhere between the disclosed structure and the literal claim
language, it is unfair to narrow the claim for the range of equivalents
to be nearly anything that is the disclosed structure and nothing more.
In Chiuminattaand Kemco Sales, the decision holding that the patents
were not infringed was based essentially upon an element-by-element
comparison of the structures. Even when the function-way-result test
was applied in Kemco Sales, the court focused on the disclosed
structures. Focusing exclusively on the disclosed structures yields no
real consideration of equivalents, i.e., either the structures are almost
exactly the same or they are not.
Undoubtedly, if the patentee had known that the claim would be
interpreted narrowly, the patentee would have drafted claims to the
structures involved, perhaps avoiding means-plus-function language
by finding a broad generic term, or perhaps the patentee would have
combed the literature to fill the disclosure with every conceivable
means. If the patentee had drafted the claims to the structures, the
claims might not have included every element of structure that the
court now includes in its element-by-element analysis. Thus, perhaps
a fair literal interpretation of the claims should require the court to
11
In re Donaldson
2

Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

1 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2184 (7th ed. 1998).
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draft a hypothetical claim that claims the structure
as broadly as
3
possible by focusing only on the essential features.1
Unfortunately, a hypothetical claim is not helpful in situations in
which functional language has been used to generically claim
structures that are very disparate. The suggestion that the patentee
has to include every possible structure is contrary to the PTO policy
that a patent does not need to include everything Imown in the prior
art. Many patents do not end up as profitable products and a
requirement that a patentee search the literature for every possible

means is an onerous one.
In order to give claim elements their fair scope, the analysis of a
§ 112, 6 claim should begin with the premise that an acceptable
range of equivalents actually could be what is literally claimed, and a
doctrine of equivalents analysis beyond a comparison of physical
structures should be applied. An accused device would literally
infringe a § 112, 6 element if it performed the same function and
was the disclosed structure. For a device that did not literally
infringe, a doctrine of equivalents analysis would determine an
equitable range of equivalents and whether the accused device fell
within that range. An equitable range of equivalents is somewhere
between the disclosed structure and the literal claim language.
Arguably, this is still less than a non-statutory doctrine of
equivalents analysis because the equivalency analysis does not
broaden the literal claim language.
Given the difficulty of
determining the elements of structure that actually would have been
claimed, and the inadequacy of verbal formulations of an equivalency
test (i.e., function-way-result, or insubstantial differences), the
determination of equivalency should be heavily weighted toward
secondary considerations.
For example, in Chiumnatta, a more satisfying decision might
have been premised on whether the device in Chiuminatta solved a
problem that existed in the art (i.e., the sparring and cracdng of wet
concrete when it was cut) and whether it is to be regarded as a patent
in a non-crowded art, perhaps one that even rises to the status of a
pioneer invention. The heart of the invention in Chiuminatta
involved applying pressure to the concrete at the point of cutting in
1

3

See Wilson Sporting Goods, Co. v.David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fd. Cir.

1990) (using a hypothetical claim to determine the appropriate scope of equivalents in viev of
the prior art. The court stated, "[lMt
may be helpfiul to conceptualize the limitation on the scope
ofequivalents by visualizing a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the
accused product The pertinent question then becomes whiether that hypothetical claim could
have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art.").
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order to solve the problem of sparring and cracking. A range of
equivalents that included squishy wheels might be appropriate if the
wheels flatten out under operation to provide an essentially flat
surface supporting the concrete at the position of cutting, the only
difference between the accused and disclosed device being that the
wheels roll along, flattening as they go-a difference that provides
little or no improvement in the invention (i.e., the wheels are an exact
substitute). Such considerations might indicate squishy wheels add
nothing except to take the copied matter outside the literal reach of
the claim.
On the other hand, perhaps the Chiuminatta device was one of
many for cutting wet concrete in a crowded art, and the squishy
wheels provided an improved means for supporting the concrete
because they deformed to the shape of the imperfections in the
concrete surface and thereby eliminated or even further reduced
sparring or cracking or advantageously allowed cutting even earlier in
the process. This fact might lead to an equitable conclusion that the
wheels were not equivalents (although it is possible for the wheels to
be patentable improvements and still infringe a pioneer patent).
Ultimately, it is more satisfying to have weighed equitable
considerations in reaching a decision than to have done something
unenunciated or to have compared physical structures.
VIII.CONCLUSION

The patent right granted should be commensurate with the scope
of the invention. In § 112,
6 cases, the patentee has claimed
broadly, and has had this broad language evaluated by the Patent and
Trademark Office for patentability. In interpreting the claims, it is
not adequate merely to compare physical structures of an accused and
a disclosed device to determine infringement.
In order to give claims falling under the auspices of § 112, 6
their fairest interpretation, the doctrine of equivalents should be

applied, and secondary considerations should weigh heavily in the
decision. Although the legislative history is sparse, the drafters
appear to have intended to codify the doctrine of equivalents. Despite
the fact that the doctrine is now codified and not equitable, its
application should yield a similar claim scope for claims drafted to
similar inventions, independent of the exact verbal formulation of the
claims. Consistent with the cases the drafters cited with approval, the
range of equivalents should be allowed to be as large as the literal
claim language in appropriate situations. Secondary considerations

2000]

§ 112, 6 CLAIM INTERPRETA TION

229

should influence the determination of the range of equivalents so that
the claim is given its fair scope.

